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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-4816 
____________ 
 
KRZYSZOF KOSZELNIK, 
     Appellant  
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY; DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; 
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES AT 
MOUNT LAUREL NEW JERSEY; DIRECTOR OF 
NEWARK DISTRICT OFFICE OF UNITED STATES  
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D. C. No. 1-13-cv-06711) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas                       
                        
                                      
Argued on February 11, 2016 
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Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 8, 2016) 
 
John K. Bleimaier, Esquire (Argued) 
15 Witherspoon Street 
Princeton, NJ 08542 
 
   Counsel for Appellant 
 
Neelam Ihsanullah, Esquire (Argued) 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
David V. Bober, Esquire 
Office of United States Attorney 
402 East State Street 
Tenton, NJ 08608 
 
   Counsel for Appellees  
 
   
 
O P I N I ON  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
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 Krzysztof Koszelnik1 filed a petition in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking review 
of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ denial of 
his naturalization application.  The District Court held that 
Koszelnik was not entitled to naturalization and granted 
summary judgement in favor of the government.  Koszelnik 
appealed.  In this appeal, we are called upon to review the 
effect of the lapsing of the statute of limitations for rescission 
of permanent resident status upon the “lawful admission” 
requirement for naturalization.2  Koszelnik was granted 
lawful permanent resident status on the basis of 
misinformation in his application; due to the lapsing of the 
statute of limitations, his resident status is no longer 
rescindable.  The District Court denied Koszelnik’s 
application for naturalization on the basis that he had failed to 
demonstrate that he was “lawfully admitted to the United 
States for permanent residence,” as required by 8 U.S.C. § 
1429.  Koszelnik now argues that because he is currently a 
lawful permanent resident, at some point he must have been 
lawfully admitted to that status.  We hold that he was not and 
therefore we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
 In September 1984, during the Soviet crackdown on 
the pro-democracy Solidarity movement in Poland, Koszelnik 
traveled from Poland to the United States on a B-2 non-
immigrant tourist visa.  Koszelnik then applied for political 
asylum.  In connection with this application, he was assigned 
                                                 
1 The correct spelling of appellant’s name is “Krzysztof,” not 
“Krzyszof” as in the caption.  
2 8 U.S.C. § 1429. 
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an “A-number.”3  Koszelnik’s asylum application was denied 
and deportation proceedings were initiated against him.  
Koszelnik appeared before an Immigration Judge, who denied 
his application for relief from deportation, found him 
deportable and granted him voluntary departure.  Because 
Koszelnik was unable to understand English, a translator was 
provided for him throughout these proceedings.  Koszelnik 
does not dispute that he was informed at his hearing before 
the Immigration Judge that if he failed to voluntarily depart, 
he would be deported.  Nevertheless, Koszelnik remained in 
the United States, and the voluntary departure order against 
him became a final deportation order by operation of law.   
 
 After residing in the United States for approximately 
ten years, Koszelnik applied for a diversity visa through the 
State Department’s lottery program.  Koszelnik failed to 
include his previously-assigned A-number on his application.  
Koszelnik also incorrectly answered “No” to the question, 
“Have you ever been deported from the U.S., or removed 
from the U.S. at government expense, excluded within the 
past year, or are you now in exclusion or deportation 
proceedings?”  Unaware of the prior deportation proceedings, 
the INS issued Koszelnik a new A-number and, in 1995, 
granted him permanent resident status.  It is undisputed that 
because of the prior order of deportation, the INS did not 
have jurisdiction over Koszelnik’s application,4 and that 
Koszelnik’s application was approved erroneously because he 
was not actually eligible for permanent resident status.  
                                                 
3 An “A-number” is an alien registration number, which the 
Department of Homeland Security assigns to foreign 
nationals applying for status in the United States.  
4 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1995); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1).   
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 Under the terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a), despite the fact 
that Koszelnik was granted permanent resident status in error, 
the statute of limitations for re-examining that status 
adjustment lapsed after five years.   Thus, it is also undisputed 
that as of 2000, Koszelnik’s permanent resident status may no 
longer be rescinded on the basis of the misinformation 
provided in his application.    
 
 In 2012, Koszelnik filed an application for 
naturalization, once again failing to provide his original A-
number and incorrectly answering “No” to the following 
questions: 
 
 Have you ever given false or misleading information 
to any U.S. Government official while applying for 
any immigration benefit or to prevent deportation, 
exclusion, or removal? 
 Have you ever been placed in removal, exclusion, 
rescission, or deportation proceedings? 
 Have you ever been ordered removed, excluded, or 
deported from the United States? 
 Have you ever applied for any kind of relief from 
removal, exclusion, or deportation?  
 
 Sometime thereafter, the government discovered its 
error in granting Koszelnik permanent residency and denied 
his naturalization application.  The government concluded 
that Koszelnik’s failure to disclose both his prior order of 
removal and his original A-number meant that he had failed 
to demonstrate that he was lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1429 and that he was 
therefore ineligible for naturalization.  Koszelnik pursued an 
administrative appeal of that decision, which was denied in 
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July 2013.  He then sought review in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of New Jersey.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment to the Government, holding that 
Koszelnik failed to meet his burden of showing that he was 
lawfully admitted and was therefore not eligible for 
naturalization.  Koszelnik appeals. 
 
II.5 
 
 To be eligible for naturalization in the United States, 
an applicant must demonstrate that he was “lawfully admitted 
to the United States for permanent residence.”6  Placing the 
burden of proof on Koszelnik to demonstrate lawful 
admission comports with the deference traditionally shown to 
the government in this area of law.  In a line of cases dating 
back almost a century, the Supreme Court has consistently 
held that “[n]o alien has the slightest right to naturalization 
unless all statutory requirements are complied with.”7  
                                                 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).  We exercise jurisdiction over the present 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 
same standard as the District Court.  See Curley v. Klem, 298 
F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when a moving party can show “that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1429. 
7 United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917).  See 
also Berenyi v. District Director, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967).   
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Because “the Government has a strong and legitimate interest 
in ensuring that only qualified persons are granted citizenship 
. . . . it has been universally accepted that the burden is on the 
alien applicant to show his eligibility for citizenship in every 
respect.”8  Thus, “doubts [about eligibility for citizenship] 
should be resolved in favor of the United States and against 
the claimant.”9   
 
 “The term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ 
means the status of having been lawfully accorded the 
privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an 
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws.”10  As 
other circuits have noted, “this definition is somewhat 
circuitous, and where there is ambiguity, we must give 
deference to the agency’s interpretation, if it is reasonable.”11  
We have adopted a similarly deferential standard, noting “we 
are especially aware that the INS’s interpretations of the 
statutes it is charged with administering have typically been 
afforded a great deal of deference.”12  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has also explained that lawful 
admission “denotes compliance with substantive legal 
requirements, not mere procedural regularity.”13  According 
                                                 
8 Berenyi, 385 U.S. at 637. 
9 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
10 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). 
11 Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)); Injeti v. U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 737 F.3d 311, 315 (4th 
Cir. 2013).  
12 Bamidele v. I.N.S., 99 F.3d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1996). 
13 In re Koloamatangi, 23 I. & N. Dec. 548, 550 (B.I.A. 2003) 
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to the BIA, an alien who has obtained lawful permanent 
resident status by fraud, or who was otherwise not entitled to 
it, has not been lawfully admitted.14  The BIA has applied this 
standard not only to fraud cases, but also to instances in 
which the alien obtained permanent resident status as a result 
of a negligent mistake by the Government.15  We endorsed 
the BIA’s interpretation of “lawful admission” in Gallimore 
v. Attorney General of the United States, finding that even in 
cases not involving fraud, a grant of permanent resident status 
does not meet the standard of “lawful admission” if the 
applicant was not legally entitled to it for any reason.16  In so 
doing, we also adopted the BIA’s position that lawful 
admission “denotes compliance with substantive legal 
requirements, not mere procedural regularity.”17  
 
 We therefore first consider whether Koszelnik’s initial 
grant of permanent resident status was “in substantive 
compliance with the immigration laws.”18  We hold that it 
was not.  As an initial matter, INS lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate Koszelnik’s adjustment application because once 
                                                                                                             
(quoting In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441 (5th Cir. 
1983)). 
14 Id. at 550-51. 
15 Arellano-Garcia, 429 F.3d at 1186-87.  
16 Gallimore, 619 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (“an alien 
whose status has been adjusted to lawful permanent resident 
but who is subsequently determined in an immigration 
proceeding to have originally been ineligible for that status 
has not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
17 Id. at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18 Id. n.6. 
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deportation proceedings are initiated against an alien, 
jurisdiction over an application for adjustment lies only with 
the Immigration Court, not with the INS.19  Since Koszelnik 
had a final order of deportation pending against him, INS 
lacked jurisdiction, and therefore its approval of the 
application did not conform to substantive legal requirements.  
 
 Koszelnik’s application for permanent residence also 
failed to conform to substantive legal requirements because it 
contained material misinformation, despite Koszelnik’s 
certification under penalty of perjury that all the information 
on his application was correct.20  A misrepresentation is 
material if it “tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is 
relevant to the alien’s eligibility and which might well have 
resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded.”21  In 
the present case, Koszelnik failed to include his original 
assigned A-number and failed to disclose the order of 
deportation that was pending against him.  It is undisputed 
that if the INS had been aware of the deportation order 
pending against Koszelnik, he would not have been granted 
lawful permanent resident status.  Thus, it is clear that 
                                                 
19 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1995); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1).   
20 Injeti, 737 F.3d at 318 (because 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) 
requires an applicant to certify that all information contained 
in the application “is true and correct,” an applicant fails to 
comply with the relevant legal requirements for admission 
when material information is omitted on his application, 
“regardless of whether the misrepresentation on [his] 
application was willful.”). 
21 Matter of Kai Hing Hui, 15 I. & N. Dec 288, 289 (B.I.A. 
1975); see also Mwongera v. I.N.S., 187 F.3d 323, 330 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
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Koszelnik’s initial admission into permanent residence did 
not conform to substantive legal requirements and was 
therefore not lawful for the purposes of naturalization. 
 
III. 
 
 We next consider Koszelnik’s contention that the 
lapsing of the statute of limitations for rescinding his 
permanent resident status transformed his admission by 
operation of law from unlawful to lawful.  In our previous 
analysis of the statute of limitations, we held that permanent 
resident status cannot be rescinded—and therefore that an 
alien granted permanent resident status cannot be deported—
on the basis of misconduct in obtaining the status after the 
statute of limitations has lapsed.22  This statute of limitations 
applies even where the alien would not have otherwise 
qualified for permanent resident status, but for the 
misinformation in the application.23  Thus, we agree that 
Koszelnik’s status as a lawful permanent resident—which 
was granted more than twenty years ago—cannot now be 
rescinded due to the misinformation in his application.   
 
 Koszelnik attempts to parlay this protection against 
rescission of permanent resident status into an argument in 
favor of citizenship, making the logical leap that because he is 
now a lawful permanent resident, it is “axiomatic” that at 
                                                 
22 Bamidele, 99 F.3d at 563 (“[T]he running of the limitation 
period bars the rescission of [applicant’s] permanent resident 
status and, in the absence of the commission of any other 
offense, thereby bars initiation of deportation proceedings in 
this case.”). 
23 Id. at 563-64. 
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some point he must have been lawfully admitted to that 
status.  According to Koszelnik, on the day that the statute of 
limitations lapsed for rescinding his status, he became 
“lawfully admitted” for naturalization purposes.  This 
argument misconstrues the purpose and effect of the statute of 
limitations.  The statute of limitations governs rescission of 
adjustment; it does not extend to the naturalization context.  
As we stated in Bamidele, the purpose of § 1256(a) is to 
ensure that noncitizens with permanent resident status are 
afforded the “security which ought to attend that status.”24  
Here, Koszelnik is in no danger of losing his permanent 
resident status.  Rather, without any real support for his 
position, Koszelnik asks this court to convert a statute meant 
to shield his lawful permanent resident status into a sword to 
compel the government to grant him citizenship.  To do so 
would greatly expand a statute without any showing of the 
legislative intent to do so.  Furthermore, while the statute of 
limitations does protect longtime residents from rescission 
and deportation, it does not undo or legalize their prior 
unlawful conduct.25  In other words, the statute of limitations 
does not erase the material misrepresentations in Koszelnik’s 
application for permanent residence; it merely bars the 
government from deporting him based on them.  
 
IV. 
 
 Koszelnik’s final argument is rooted in equity.  He 
argues that a lifetime ban on naturalization is a “harsh 
                                                 
24 Bamidele, 99 F.3d at 564. 
25 See Smith v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 714, 720 (2013) (“[A]lthough 
the statute of limitations may inhibit prosecution, it does not 
render the underlying conduct noncriminal.”). 
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penalty,” unsupported by strict construction of the relevant 
statute.  According to Koszelnik, it would be unfair to forever 
block him from naturalization based on the misinformation in 
his initial application for permanent residence, without a 
showing of express Congressional intent to do so.  This 
argument fails for two reasons.  First, the equity 
considerations in this case do not weigh in Koszelnik’s favor.  
As stated by the District Court: 
 
 [Koszelnik] should have been deported approximately 
 15 years ago.  Instead, he  remained in the United 
 States and has since benefitted from the Government’s 
 (1) mistake in granting him permanent resident status 
 and (2) failure to discover its mistake in time to 
 remove [Koszlenik].  Thus, [Koszelnik] is now legally 
 permitted to stay in the United States indefinitely.  
 That [Koszelnik] cannot obtain  citizenship hardly 
 seems unfair under such circumstances.26    
 
Furthermore, even if this Court did agree that barring 
Koszelnik from naturalization was a harsh penalty, we lack 
equity powers to override statutory requirements and grant 
Koszelnik citizenship.27  “The power to make someone a 
citizen of the United States has not been conferred upon the 
federal courts . . . . [r]ather, it has been given them as a 
                                                 
26 Koszelnik v. Secretary of Dept. of Homeland Sec., 2014 
WL 6471479 at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2014). 
27 I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885 (1988) (“Neither by 
application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation of 
equitable powers, nor by any other means does a court have 
the power to confer citizenship in violation of 
[Congressional] limitations.”).  
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specific function to be performed in strict compliance with 
the terms of an authorizing statute.”28  Here, there is a clear 
Congressional mandate that only applicants who demonstrate 
strict compliance with all of the statutory requirements for 
citizenship may be naturalized.29  Koszelnik failed to do so.  
“Once it has been determined that a person does not qualify 
for citizenship, the [] court has no discretion to ignore the 
defect and grant citizenship.”30 
 
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.31  
                                                 
28 Id. at 884-85. 
29 Federenko v. U.S., 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981).  
30 Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 884. 
31 Two panels of this Court are filing opinion in Koszelnik v. 
Secretary, No. 14-4816, and Saliba v. Attorney General, No. 
15-3769, on this day dealing with similar issues.  Each 
opinion is a further precedent supporting the other opinion. 
